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Wars continue to ravage in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Refugees are wandering around 
aimlessly in the Middle East with many fleeing to Europe. Saudi Arabia and Iran 
are adding fuel to the flames. They are vying for supremacy while remaining 
highly suspicious of each other. A Conference for Security and Cooperation could 
help to ease existing tensions. Many years ago the CSCE was a resounding  success. 
It could thus serve as a blueprint with the nuclear agreement with Iran as a star-
ting point of such a venture.
Tensions in the Middle East are getting increas-
ingly worse. War has engulfed Syria, western Iraq 
and Yemen. Borders are losing their relevance, 
while state structures are disintegrating. The 
various conflicts tend to be defined by ethnic 
and religious cleavages. Minorities ranging from 
Christians to Yazidis, and even majority groups 
such as the Sunnis in Syria, are being driven from 
their homes. Churches have been torched. There 
have been attacks on mosques. Territories are be-
ing controlled by dozens of militias around whose 
edges bitter battles are raging. The “Islamic State” 
has established itself, commits terror, and holds 
sway in areas such as western Iraq and eastern 
Syria where Sunni tribes have been marginalized. 
Air strikes by an international alliance have in-
flicted some damage on the “IS,” but have been 
unable to stop its progress. Instead, Iraqi Shiite 
militias under the leadership of Iranian generals 
are fighting a ground war against the “IS”. The 
Assad regime has even dropped barrel bombs 
banned by international law on its own citizens. 
As a result, millions of people are on the run, 
most of them within Syria and Iraq. Many have 
been stranded in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and 
the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. Hundreds of 
thousands are fleeing to Europe.
Left to themselves, the local warring factions will 
find it difficult to bring the fighting to an end. The 
fact is that both small and larger Middle Eastern 
powers such as Turkey, Iran, Qatar, the United 
Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel, are 
influencing or fuelling the various ethnic, reli-
gious and political conflicts in the region.
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increasing Iranian influence in the region, there 
is growing unease in Riyadh about US policy on 
the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is dependent on the 
US military umbrella and is no longer sure that 
Washington will provide full-scale protection in 
the event of a conflict. Riyadh assumes that the 
recent US-Iranian rapprochement in the wake of 
the positive outcome of the nuclear negotiations 
between Iran and the EU3+3 will be detrimental 
for the US-Saudi relationship. The kingdom the 
kingdom also senses that it is not getting whole-
hearted US support for its anti-Assad and anti-
Houthi stance, or indeed for its pro-Sisi policy in 
Egypt. Due to the fact that Saudi Arabia feels both 
anxious and left alone, the kingdom is increas-
ingly ready to assume regional leadership in the 
Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
Along with other Arab Gulf states, it has pursued 
a growing militarization of its regional policies. 
Examples of this are the intervention in Bahrain 
in 2011, the struggle against the “Islamic State” 
as part of an international coalition, and the 
Saudi-Sunni alliance, which in March 2015 began 
to intervene in the Yemeni civil war by carrying 
out a number of airstrikes.
Iran, meanwhile, has for many years felt encir-
cled in military and political terms by the US and 
its allies in the region to which Iran also includes 
Saudi Arabia versus Iran
Saudi Arabia and Iran in particular have spon-
sored a number of different warring factions and 
conflicting parties in order to consolidate or ex-
pand their zones of influence in the Middle East. 
As part of this hegemonic struggle, both countries 
are striving for political and military supremacy in 
the Gulf region. While Iran thinks of itself as the 
protector of the Shi’a, Saudi Arabia considers it-
self a leader of the Sunnis. Ethnic identity is also of 
some relevance for the Iranians are of Indo-Germa- 
nic descent, whereas Arabs are a Semitic people.
Inside Saudi Arabia, there is a deep mistrust of 
Iran. The House of Saud sees the Islamic Republic 
as the winner of the collapse of Arab state struc-
tures. Iran, so the thinking goes, profits from the 
rule of the militias, which includes Hezbollah in 
Lebanon, from the Assad regime in Damascus, 
and from the Shia groups in central and south-
ern Iraq. Riyadh is convinced of an Iranian hid-
den hand ranging from the conflict between Shi’a 
and Sunnis in Bahrain, the territorial gains made 
by the Shi’a Houthi rebels in Yemen, to support 
for Shi’a groups in the eastern provinces of the 
kingdom. Furthermore, many Saudis believe that 
the Iranian mullahs are intent on exporting their 
version of Islam. In addition to fears about the 
Source: polgeonow.com  
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Saudi Arabia.  The hardliners in Iran believe that 
this encirclement is simply the prelude to an 
attempt at regime change. Apart from this, 
Tehran suspects that in the struggle against the 
Assad regime Riyadh and the West intent to sev-
er Iran’s links with the Shi’a Hezbollah group in 
Lebanon, and weaken Iran’s overall influence in 
the Middle East. The regime thus feels on the 
defensive, and has increasingly opted for direct 
military, financial and political support for Shi’a 
militias and other groups in the Arab world. In 
addition, Iran’s nuclear and missile program 
is supposed to act as a deterrent. Within the 
context of the struggle against the “Islamic 
State”, the argument now heard in Tehran is that 
Iran’s interests are the same as those of the US. 
Parts of the leadership fear that “IS” may infil-
trate the marginalised Arab-Sunni minority in 
western Iran.
The bottom line is that without a rapprochement 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it will be impos-
sible to defuse, bring to an end or resolve the local 
conflicts currently raging in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq 
and Yemen. In fact, there is a danger that local 
wars will continue to escalate, that there will be 
an arms race, and that mutual perceptions of one 
another will further deteriorate.
Prospects for Easing of Tensions
But there are also signs of potential thaws 
in Saudi-Iranian relations. King Salman bin 
 Abdelaziz Al-Saud, the new Saudi monarch, 
has appointed Muhammad Bin Nayef, the long- 
serving Minister of Interior, to the position of 
crown prince in the kingdom. Prince Mohammed 
Bin Nayef is also chairman of the newly estab-
lished Political and Security Affairs Council, a key 
position. The Crown Prince has the reputation of 
being a level-headed political realist who will not 
risk an unnecessary confrontation with Iran.In 
Tehran, the nuclear agreement has  strengthened 
the hand of moderate supporters of President 
Hassan Rouhani who wish to overcome Iran’s 
international isolation. Even if scepticism is still 
rife in Riyadh, King Salman bin  Abdulaziz has 
given a cautious welcome to the EU3+3 frame-
work agreement with Iran concluded in April 
2015 and has expressed the hope that it will 
make a contribution to security and stability in 
the region.
In the long run, however, the nuclear agreement 
with Iran can prove more effective and lasting 
if it is complemented by other initiatives which 
seek to create trust in the region and to contain 
the current conflict areas. On its own, the nu-
clear agreement unfolds too little impact. There 
is a danger that a nuclear arms race will simply 
been deferred for a few years, while the hostilities 
and proxy wars in the region continue unabated. 
Instead, the development of confidence-building 
measures and collective security systems are the 
only steps which can stop this downward spiral.
In the past, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have come 
out with proposals for a security system in the Gulf 
region. As early as 2004, at the Manama Dialogue 
in Bahrain, former Saudi foreign minister Saud 
al-Faisal outlined a security system based on four 
pillars: a united Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); 
a stable Iraq; a friendly Iran; and a prosperous 
Yemen. The system as such would receive inter-
national support from the UN Security Council. 
In January 2007, at the World Economic Forum in 
Davos, Hassan Rouhani, who has been President 
of Iran since 2013, presented a ten-point plan for 
security and cooperation in the Gulf region.
Critics content that Iran and Saudi Arabia simply 
do not feel sufficient pressure to encourage them 
to bury the hatchet and to cooperate on a regional 
level. At the same time, both states could soon 
find themselves under socio-economic pres-
sures to engage leading to some form of common 
Source: polgeonow.com 
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to more employment opportunities and greater 
revenues. If, in sub-regional negotiations of this 
kind, “positive socio-economic incentives” are 
not enough to persuade governments to change 
their policies, “negative security policy incen-
tives” such as, for example, common fears about 
the spread of the “Islamic State” could provide 
such a basis. The fact that “IS” will, it appears, 
continue to exist for an extended period of time 
in eastern Syria and western Iraq, will even make 
territorial gains from time to time, and com-
mit more terror, is alarming as far as Riyadh and 
Tehran are concerned. Such fears could prompt 
Saudi Arabia and Iran to reach a compromise in 
the Syrian conflict, including removing the lead-
ership of the Assad regime and replacing it with a 
transitional military council which will include a 
significant number of Alawites.
A CSCE for the Gulf
Thus, a certain basis for an initiative towards a 
Gulf negotiating process exists. To proceed, it 
would have to be structured on parallel tracks. 
Important political topics such as the war against 
terrorism, the future of Syria, Iraq and Yemen, 
interests. For example, all of the states in the 
region are facing the demographic challenge of 
fulfilling rising expectations of their youthful 
citizens, and of providing educational and em-
ployment opportunities for a  growing number of 
young people. Additional expenditure on welfare 
projects and the expansion of the rentier economy 
will not be enough in order to deal with this po-
tential source of unrest. For the moment, Riyadh 
can fall back on its capital reserves while Teheran 
can expect an increase in its revenue as a result of 
the easing of sanctions.
Less Oil, More Trade
According to the recent BP Statistical Review of 
Energy, global consumption of oil and gas is fore-
casted to continue to decline even during periods 
of economic growth. As a result, the budgets of 
Iran and Saudi Arabia (which are predominantly 
based on oil and gas revenues) will shrink. With 
less money available for welfare projects, the 
governments will have to find other sources of 
income. Here, an increase in regional trade, a 
greater level of investment, and an upsurge in 
the manufacturing and services sector will lead 
Gulf: Economic and Social Data
Source: Gulf Research Center
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and relations between Iran, Saudi Arabia and the 
other GCC states should be at the top of the agen-
da. Such high-level political dialogue should at 
the same time be complemented by negotiations 
on specific pragmatic topics which can make a 
contribution to the confidence-building process. 
Suitable negotiating topics would be a policy on 
refugees, infrastructure projects, environmental 
protection measures including improved sup-
plies of drinking water, cooperation in the energy 
sector, the expansion of regional economic rela-
tions, a common framework for trade and invest-
ment, and a common regional labour market. This 
dual-track negotiating structure for the “Gulf” 
sub-region is based in principle on the model 
of the successful Conference for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was held in 
the 1970s, and on its three negotiating baskets - 
one for political and military questions, one for 
economic and environmental topics, and one for 
humanitarian and human rights issues.
The Final Act of the CSCE was signed in Helsinki 
40 years ago, and the Conference later developed 
into an institution, the OSCE, with its head-
quarters in Vienna. That the OSCE has not lost 
its relevance following the end of the East-West 
conflict is currently underlined by the important 
conflict management role the organization plays 
in eastern Ukraine. To be sure, the CSC process in 
Europe cannot simply be copied and transferred 
lock, stock and barrel to the Gulf region. However, 
the principle of collective security promoted by 
confidence-building measures that are specified 
in three working groups (or “baskets”) is also of 
importance for the striving of peace, security and 
cooperation in the “Gulf” sub-region.
The “Gulf” sub-region in the Middle East com-
prises Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the smaller 
Gulf states, i.e. the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. Riyadh will insist that 
any negotiating process will focus on the over-
all regional situation and not only on relation-
ship between Riyadh and Tehran. On the one 
hand, this will enable the Saudis to point to the 
existence of a broad and united Arab front. On 
the other, it will help to allay fears in the smaller 
GCC states that Saudi Arabia is trying to conclude 
separate agreements behind their backs. That is 
why it is important to incorporate all of the GCC 
states. In geographical terms, Iraq and Yemen 
are also part of the “Gulf” sub-region. After the 
controversial period of Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki, Iraq has a new leadership under Prime 
Minister Haider al-Abadi and a government that 
is recognized by both Iran and Saudi Arabia. And 
although the central government in Baghdad has 
only a very tenuous hold on parts of the west of 
Iraq, and has to coordinate its policies with the 
autonomous Kurdish government in northern 
Iraq, the al-Abadi administration should have a 
place at the negotiating table. Yemen should also 
be invited to participate in the Gulf negotiating 
process, though only after the formation of an in-
clusive and viable government. 
The basic framework for a negotiating process 
in the Gulf sub-region would thus initially be a 
6 + 2 setup (the six states of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, and Iran and Iraq) to be joined by Yemen 
as soon as there is a recognized and inclusive gov-
ernment in Sana’a.
Turkey, Israel and Egypt are important regional 
powers in the Middle East with influence and 
interests in the Gulf region. The brokers of a 
Gulf negotiating process should keep their eye 
on these three countries in order to incorporate 
them at a later stage into (or into sections of) the 
negotiations.
Given the current climate in the region and in 
order to provide such a process with a potential 
for success, it is important that the idea for such 
a diplomatic initiative should come from outside 
the region and indeed from a powerful external 
actor acceptable to all sides who will issue invita-
tions and act as a moderator.
Who should moderate?
The constellation of a “Gulf” mediation group 
could take on a variety of forms.  The US, Europe 
(in particular the larger member states United 
Kingdom, France, and Germany), Russia, China, 
India and Japan are all important actors in the 
Gulf region and possess various ways to exert 
influence on Iran and Saudi Arabia. On a diplo-
matic level, they could prove useful as mediators 
and sponsors in order to persuade the conflict-
ing parties to come to the negotiating table. This 
list includes all the Permanent Members of the 
UN Security Council. It could be possible to form 
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with the US, which maintains a powerful military 
presence in the region. Japan is an Asian mem-
ber of the OSCE and in 2016 Germany will assume 
the chairmanship of the OSCE, which, along with 
its instruments, principles and modules, could 
provide a blueprint for a Gulf CSC.Furthermore, 
there are two regional mediation platforms that 
also present themselves. One of them is the 
Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the 
members of which include Iran, Iraq, and the 6 
GCC states. The other is the Sultanate of Oman, 
which is a member of the GCC. It maintains bet-
ter relations with Iran than any of the other Arab 
Gulf states. In 2013, Muscat brokered the first 
a “Gulf” mediation group made up of P5 repre-
sentatives coupled with diplomats from Berlin, 
New Delhi and Tokyo. Other mediating group 
structures are also conceivable, i.e. a duo consist-
ing of the European Union and China. While both 
have widespread economic interests in the Gulf 
region, they do not play an overt role in security 
policy terms. They could therefore come across as 
being more or less neutral. One could also envi-
sion two nation-states, Germany and Japan, act-
ing as mediators. Neither of these countries has a 
colonial past in the region. They are not perma-
nent members of the UN Security Council, but are 
still very influential in the UN and on good terms 
Design for a dual-track Gulf negotiating process
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung  
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important bilateral talks between Washington 
and Tehran, and at the moment Oman is playing a 
crucial mediation role in the Yemeni civil war.
It is also conceivable that, after the finalization of 
the details within the current framework agree-
ment on the Iranian nuclear programme, the bi-
lateral EU3+3 talks with Iran could be transformed 
and turned into a sub-regional negotiating pro-
cess. In other words, they could be expanded by 
incorporating other regional actors, i.e. Iraq and 
the GCC, and, if it becomes necessary to do so, the 
mediating states alluded to above.
Sceptics have pointed out that given that the an-
tagonists in Riyadh and Tehran appear as yet not 
ready to resolve their conflict, the role of media-
tors will be unable to make an impact.
This may well be the case. However, given that the 
dramatic consequences of the Middle East wars 
call for diplomatic engagement, that there exists 
a certain willingness in both Iran and Saudi Arabia 
to talk and to consider areas of agreement, and 
that the conclusion of a nuclear agreement with 
Tehran may well encourage politicians to come 
up with new and creative political and diplomatic 
solutions designed to contain and defuse some 
of the conflicts and divisions in the Gulf region, 
suggests that a mediation initiative should be at-
tempted and pursued. A Gulf CSC can provide a 
framework and a process within which the states 
of the “Gulf” sub-region can address the press-
ing problems of the region in a peaceful manner. 
Without a comprehensive diplomatic initiative, 
the downward spiral of violence threatens to con-
tinue unabated. Moreover, a Gulf CSC can func-
tion as a kind of diplomatic and political safety net 
which will prove its worth if the implementation 
of the nuclear agreement grinds to a halt or turns 
out to be a failure.
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